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Compelling Arbitration and
the Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards
ALAN C. SVAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
I will discuss the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate com-
mercial disputes. This will be supplemented, as necessary, by a more
abbreviated discussion of the enforceability of arbitral awards and of
foreign judgments confirming foreign awards. I intend to focus on the
law likely to prevail in a state or federal court sitting in Florida in
cases where the arbitration is to occur outside this State. Normally,
the place of arbitration is designated in the arbitral agreement or by
mutual agreement of the parties after a dispute arises. On occasion,
an arbitral association (e.g., American Arbitration Association, Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce) is given the responsibility for desig-
nating the place of the arbitration.
In discussing the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate, I will
focus on two distinct types of action. The first is a simple motion,
filed after one of the parties has commenced a judicial proceeding,
asking the court to stay those proceedings while the parties arbitrate
their dispute in accordance with the agreement. The second type of
enforcement action is a request that the court compel the reluctant
party to arbitrate the dispute in accordance with the arbitral agree-
ment. This latter is, of course, in the nature of a request for specific
performance and may accompany a motion to stay a judicial proceed-
ing or may be brought as an original matter.
In dealing with a case where the arbitration is to take place out-
side this State, the Florida lawyer, whether acting as draftsman of an
arbitral agreement or as advocate in a potential enforcement action,
confronts a problem that may be unique in all American law. First,
there is a basic disparity between Florida and federal law on the fun-
damental question of whether such agreements are enforceable. Sec-
ond, this disparity is reflected in a similar difference between Florida
and federal law regarding the enforceability of any arbitral award that
might actually be obtained in the case. Third, grave uncertainties at-
* Professor of Law, University of Miami, School of Law; J.D., 1957, University of
Chicago; Associate, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley, McCloy, N.Y.; Assistant General
Counsel, Agency for International Development; Professorial Lecturer, Graduate
School of Business, University of Chicago.
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tend the question of whether and when the Florida courts will or are
required to apply federal law (the federal courts will clearly apply
Florida law when federal law is, by its terms, inapplicable). Fourth,
courts in- other jurisdictions, both in the United States and abroad,
frequently follow a much more liberal policy toward arbitration than
Florida law permits, and the possibilities for, and effects of, actions in
these courts is a matter which the Florida lawyer cannot afford to
ignore. These four basic propositions interact to establish the strategic
possibilities that the Florida lawyer may eventually face. Before de-
scribing these strategic possibilities and the ways to deal with them,
however, it is necessary to review each of the basic propositions in
turn.
II. DISPARITY BETWEEN FLORIDA AND FEDERAL LAWv
REGARDING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
Traditionally, because arbitration tends to compete with the
courts as a means for the settlement of private controversies, the
common law looked askance at all agreements to arbitrate future dis-
putes. 1 Such agreements were deemed revocable at any time prior
to the issuance of an award, and were thus unenforceable. 2 Both the
Congress of the United States and the Florida legislature, however,
have changed the common law, but they have done so in differing
ways.
Under the Florida Arbitration Code (the "Florida Code"), 3 writ-
ten agreements to arbitrate future disputes are enforceable, but only
if the arbitration is subject to the Florida Code. 4 The question
whether the Florida Code will control is a matter of the parties' in-
tent. 5 Where the agreement makes no specific reference to the
1. S. ELLIOT, ARBITRATION, MATERIALS AND CASES (1968).
2. Id.
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01-.22 (1977).
4. FLA. STAT. § 682.02 (1977), which states:
Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitration any
controversy or they may include in a written contract a provision for the
settlement by arbitration of any controversy thereafter arising between
them relating to such contract or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof. Such agreement or provisions shall bc valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable without regard to the justiciable character of the controversy;
provided that this act shall not apply to any such agreement or provision
to arbitrate in which it is stipulated that this law shall not apply or to any
arbitration or award thereunder. (emphasis added).
5. Wickes Corp. v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 493 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1974) (where
the parties clear intent was that the Florida Arbitration Code not apply, contract
must be interpreted by common law principles).
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Code, a stipulation that the place of arbitration is to be outside
Florida will be read as implying an intent not to have the Florida
Code apply. 6 In such a case, the common law rule comes into play
and the agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable. Presumably, the
same rule would apply if a foreign situs were chosen by mutual
agreement of the parties after the dispute arose, provided the agree-
ment made no specific reference to the Florida Code.
If the arbitral agreement is silent, both as to the applicability of
the Florida Code and the place of arbitration, the Florida courts have
considered as controlling any general choice of law clause found in
the contract. 7 If the contract is to be governed by Florida law, this
will usually be treated as evidence of an intent to arbitrate under the
Florida Code, and the arbitral agreement will be considered enforce-
able. No case has been found involving a general Florida choice of
law clause, coupled with an arbitral clause, designating a foreign ar-
bitral situs. Arguably, the general choice of law clause should be con-
strued as manifesting an intent to arbitrate under Florida law, but no
decision as yet exists to confirm the point. In the absence of a choice
of law clause, the courts have tended to examine the extent to which
the underlying subject matter of the contract is connected with
Florida in determining whether the parties "intended" for the arbitra-
tion to occur under the Florida Code.
If, as a consequence of these rules, Florida law would treat an
agreement to arbitrate as unenforceable, either party to the agree-
ment can simply refuse to submit the dispute to arbitration and can
then proceed to file suit in a Florida court on the merits of that
6. Damora v. Stresscon Int'l., Inc., 324 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1975)_ In this case, the
Supreme Court of Florida held that the rights of the parties were dependent on the
contract terms and not the State of Florida arbitration procedures. Where the con-
tract provided that the arbitration would take place in New York, the inference was
that New York arbitration law would govern; but New York arbitration could not be
held to oust a Florida court of jurisdiction.
7. In Knight v. H.S. Equities, Inc., 280 So.2d 456 (1973), the Fourth District
Court of Appeals of Florida stated:
[T]he customer's agreement contained a specific stipulation that the
laws of the State of New York shall govern the enforcement of the agree-
ment. Such a proviso, we feel, falls within the emphasized language ap-
pearing in Section 682.02 . . . rendering arbitration provisions unenforce-
able in Florida. Where it is stipulated that an agreement to arbitrate and
its enforcement are governed by the laws of another state, such agreement
does not comply with Chapter 682 and is not specifically enforceable in
this state. 280 So.2d at 459.
See also Condotel Bahamas, Ltd. v. Leavell Bahamas, Ltd., 276 So.2d 189, cert.
denied, 281 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1973).
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dispute. That court will neither stay its own proceedings nor compel the
recalcitrant party to comply with the arbitral agreement. In such a
situation, however, it is quite possible that the agreement to arbitrate
will be enforceable by a court in some other jurisdiction in spite of
the proceedings pending in Florida. The situation, in other words,
invites a race to the courthouse with a number of possible
consequences to which we shall turn later.
All of this is in sharp contrast to the situation under federal law.
The latter is embodied in two sources: the Federal Arbitration Act
(the "Federal Act"); and the United Nations Convention on the En-
forcement and Recognition of Arbitral Awards (the "U.N. Conven-
tion"). 8 Under the Federal Act, agreements to arbitrate are enforce-
able if in writing and if contained in "any maritime transaction" or in
"a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce." 9  The
place of arbitration designated in the agreement has no direct bearing
on the question of whether the agreement is enforceable. This means
that in any case involving an arbitral agreement subject to the Fed-
eral Act, a federal court must stay its own proceedings, even if
arbitration is to be held outside the United States. 10 There is some
question as to whether the venue provision contained in section 4 of
the Federal Act' 1 prohibits a federal court from issuing an order
compelling arbitration if the place of arbitration is outside the district
in which the court sits. The authorities seem divided on the point.
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the
venue provisions of section 4 are waivable by agreement of the par-
ties, and that a clause fixing the place of arbitration outside a particu-
lar district constitutes such a waiver, provided venue is otherwise
properly laid in that district. 12
8. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970). Chapter one of title nine will hereinafter be referred
to as "'Federal Act," while chapter two will be referred to as "the implementing
legislation." The latter implements the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (hereinaf-
ter the "U.N. Convention").
9. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
10. Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States ex rel. Virginia-Carolina Electri-
cal Works, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944) (granting a stay of proceedings until arbitra-
tion could be had in a suit by subcontractor against contractor and surety to receive
for labor and materials furnished pursuant to § 3 of the Federal Act); Penalver v.
Compagnie de Navigation Frutiere Matouba, 428 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(stay was not precluded by the fact that arbitration might have to take place in
London where contract provided for such arbitration).
11. 9 U.S.C. at § 4.
12. City of Naples v. Prepakt Concrete Co., 490 F.2d 182 (5th Cir.), reh. denied,
494 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974). Accord, Garner Lumber
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As already noted, the Federal Act only applies if the arbitral
clause is contained in a "contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce." "Commerce" is defined as "commerce among the several
States and with foreign nations."13 This has been interpreted to
exclude any contract involving only commerce between two foreign
nations, even if one or both parties are citizens of the United States
or the contract was made in this country. 14 Moreover, while the
Supreme Court has made clear that the term "commerce" is not
limited to contracts between merchants for the interstate or foreign
shipments of goods, 15 there has been some dispute over whether the
phrase "transactions involving commerce" is to be interpreted more
narrowly than the phrase "affecting commerce" traditionally used in
federal statutes.
In Bernhart v. Polygraphic Company of America, 16 the Supreme
Court held that a contract between a New York corporation engaged
in interstate commerce and a private individual which was made in
New York for the performance of services exclusively in Vermont was
not a "transaction involving commerce." Where, however, the local
services were found to be "inextricably related" to the interstate sale
of goods, the Federal Act was held to be applicable. 17 The Act was
also applied to a sub-contract made in Georgia between a Georgia
sub-contractor and a New York prime contractor for work to be per-
formed exclusively in Georgia because the prime contractor made in-
terstate shipments of materials and personnel for the Georgia
project. 18 Where both the guarantor and debtor in a contract of
guaranty were Texas residents and the debt was incurred in Texas,
Co. v. Randolph E. Valensi Lange, Inc., 513 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir. 1975). But see
Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U.S. 449 (1935);
Batson Yarn & Fabrics Machine Group v. Saurer-Allma GmbH-Allgaver Maschinen-
ban, 311 F. Supp. 68 (D. S.C. 1970). See also, the implementing legislation of the
U.S. Convention, 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
13. 9 U.S.C. at § 1.
14. The Volsinio, 32 F.2d 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
15. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)
(hereinafter "Prima Paint").
16. 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (hereinafter "Bernhardt"). Accord, Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
17. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 401.
18. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc. v. United States, 306 F.2d 554 (5th Cir.
1962), rev'd on other grounds sub norn., Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities,
Inc., 374 U.S. 167 (1963) (hereinafter "Moseley"). See also Varley v. Tarrytown As-
soc., Inc., 477 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1973), suggesting that the "local services" limitation
of Bernhardt was no longer viable in light of Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972)
(baseball held to be exempt from the scope of the federal antitrust laws).
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the Federal Act was held applicable to the guaranty agreement, since
the debt was found to be related to the debtor's business as a Texas
distributor for products supplied by the New York creditor, even
though the latter was not a party to the guaranty agreement. 19
In sum, under the Federal Act, in contrast to the Florida Code,
all written contracts to arbitrate that come within the scope of the Act
are enforceable subject only to some uncertainty regarding the power
of the federal court to compel arbitration at a place outside the dis-
trict in which it sits. Certainly, however, such a court must stay its
own proceedings.
The U.N. Convention has a similar effect. Any nation that is a
party to the Convention is required "to recognize an agreement" to
arbitrate which is writing. 20 Apparently, no distinction is to be
drawn between the "recognition" of agreements (i.e., a stay of judicial
proceedings) and the "enforcement" of agreements (i.e., compelling
arbitration). 21 This seems clear from the implementing legislation
which expressly empowers the federal district courts to "direct that
arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement." Such direc-
tions may pertain to arbitration at any place "within or without" the
United States.
Moreover, it should be noted that the U.N. Convention is
closely tied to several provisions of the Federal Act. Only "commer-
cial" agreements that are subject to the Federal Act (i.e., relate to a
"maritime transaction" or a "transaction involving commerce among
the several States and with foreign nations") are subject to the Con-
vention. 22 The "commercial agreement" requirement, however, is
to be interpreted very broadly. It was apparently intended to exclude
only such matters as "matrimonial and other domestic relations
agreements, political agreements and the like." 2 3  The requirement
that the arbitral agreement relates to interstate or foreign commerce,
however, is to be interpreted in the same way as under the Federal
Act. Thus, arbitral agreements pertaining solely to commerce
between two foreign nations are apparently not subject to the
19. Griffin v. Semperit of America, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
20. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, supra
note 8, at art. 11 (1).
21. Id. Accord, McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ceat S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032 (3d
Cir. 1974).
22. 9 U.S.C. at § 202.
23. Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1, 13
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, without deciding point, 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 986 (1974).
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Convention. Also, under the implementing legislation, if both parties
to the agreement are United States citizens, the Convention applies
only if "the relationship involves property located abroad, envisages
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable
relation with one or more foreign states."
24
Lastly, among the more ambiguous limitations upon the applica-
bility of the Convention is that derived from a "reservation" which
the United States issued when it ratified the Convention. The Con-
vention applies only "in respect of arbitral awards" issued in a foreign
state that is also party to the Convention and then only upon the
basis of "reciprocity." 2 5 This raises two questions: first, does the
"'reciprocity" requirement for the enforcement of arbitral awards carry
over into the enforcement of arbitral agreements? It would seem
logical to think so. If this is the case, does it mean that where a
non-citizen is party to the arbitral agreement, the Convention applies
only if: (1) that citizen is a citizen of a nation that is party to the
Convention; (2) the arbitration is to take place in a nation that is party
to the Convention; or (3) the arbitral agreement has some substantial
relationship or contact with a nation that is party to the Convention?
This "reciprocity" requirement is potentially a major limitation
on the use of the Convention in arbitral agreements involving trade
with the other countries of the Americas. While, as of January 1,
1978, forty-nine other countries had become parties to the Conven-
tion, the only countries to ratify the Convention in the Americas by
that date were Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago
and territories to which the Convention is applicable by reason of
British and Dutch accession.
2 6
Against the background of this brief comparison between federal
law and Florida law, one can begin to appreciate the nature of the
problem confronting the Florida lawyer. Insofar as the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate is concerned, the Florida legislature has, in ef-
fect, mandated only a very grudging exception to the old common law
rule that viewed all such agreements with hostility. Only agreements
under which the arbitration is to be subject to the Florida Code are en-
forceable. Federal law, on the other hand, whether derived from the
Federal Act or the U.N. Convention, mandates a complete reversal of
the common law rule in the case of any arbitral agreement within the
purview of that law. Such agreements are enforceable without regard
24. 9 U.S.C. at § 202.
25. The U.N. Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, T.I.A.S., No. 6997.
26. See note 11, supra.
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to the place of arbitration or the law governing the conduct of the
arbitral proceedings.
Later, we shall observe how this disparity carries over into the
enforcement of arbitral awards. Before doing so, however, it is neces-
sary to examine two other circumstances: (1) the rules governing the
exercise of federal court jurisdiction in these matters; and (2) the at-
titude of the Florida courts toward the Federal Act.
III. JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ACT IN THE FLORIDA COURTS
A unique characteristic of the Federal Act is that no action to
enforce an arbitral agreement may be maintained in a federal court,
even if the agreement is subject to the Act, on the ground that the
case "arises under" federal law. In other words, the mere fact that
the case is controlled by federal law is not sufficient to warrant the
exercise of "federal question" jurisdiction within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Jurisdiction of the federal court must be predicated
upon diversity of citizenship, admiralty, or some other jurisdictional
grant. 27
It is easy to assume that when a contract pertains to an interna-
tional transaction, diversity of citizenship will always exist. But this is
not so. No diversity exists, for example, if both parties to the agree-
ment are foreign citizens, a result that may obtain if both parties are
wholly-owned subsidiaries of American corporations. No diversity
exists if both parties to the contract are citizens of the same state, a
not unlikely circumstance in international transactions because many
U.S. corporations place their international operations in separate cor-
porations organized under domestic law. No diversity exists in a mul-
tiparty suit if one plaintiff and one defendant are citizens of the same
state, even though all other plaintiffs and defendants are citizens of
different states. Moreover, even if diversity of citizenship does exist,
only a non-resident defendant can remove a case commenced in the
Florida courts to a federal court. On the other hand, these jurisdic-
tional problems do not arise in cases governed by the U.N. Conven-
tion. Under the implementing legislation, all such cases are expressly
deemed to raise a "federal question."
27. 9 U.S.C. at §§ 203, 205. McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ceat S.p.A., 501
F.2d at 1037.
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With respect to the Federal Act, the problem of access to the
federal courts is particularly important to the Florida lawyer because
of the uncertainities that exist regarding the willingness of the Florida
courts to apply that Act in cases where it is otherwise applicable to
the arbitral agreement. It is this uncertainty that creates what is quite
possibly a situation unique to American law.
The Supreme Court of the United States has established two
propositions. First, where the arbitral agreement relates solely to
intra-state commerce, or commerce between two foreign countries, a
federal court, sitting in diversity, is required to apply the appropriate
state or foreign law regarding the enforceability of the agreement.
28
Second, where the arbitral agreement relates to interstate or foreign
commerce, the Federal Act has been construed to create a body of
substantive federal law binding upon a federal court, even though the
court's jurisdiction rests exclusively upon the diverse citizenship of
the parties. 29 Against this background, the question is whether that
body of substantive federal law is also binding upon state courts in
cases where the arbitral agreement relates to interstate or foreign
commerce.
On this question, it is possible to argue that the leading Supreme
Court decision, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co., 30 is ambiguous. That decision may be interpreted as footing the
Federal Act narrowly upon Congress' power to prescribe rules of pro-
cedure for the federal courts rather than upon Congress' substantive
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Under such a
reading, of course, the Federal Act would not be binding upon the
State courts. 31
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that this reading
of the majority opinion in Prima Paint is contrary to the reading by
Justice Black in dissent. 32 It has not been followed by the lower
federal courts or by the highest courts of most States, including those
in New York, California, Illinois, and Georgia. All of the latter have
read the Federal Act as footed upon the commerce clause and have,
28. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 198.
29. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404-05.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 405-06 n.13. In dissent, Mr. Justice Black disagreed with this
hypothesis, and read the Prima Paint majority as basing the Federal Act upon the
commerce clause. Thus, in his opinion, the Federal Act was binding upon the states.
Id. at 409-10.
32. Id.
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therefore, considered themselves bound to apply that Act in all cases
involving arbitral agreements to which the Act is, by its terms,
applicable.
Unfortunately, the situation in Florida is not so clear. There are
a number 'of Florida decisions in which the Florida courts proceeded
to apply Florida law without mention of the Federal Act, 33 although
it was clearly arguable that the arbitral agreements related to in-
terstate commerce. Perhaps these cases rest sub silentio upon a find-
ing that only intrastate commerce was involved. If so, a number of
them are very suspect indeed. Alternatively, perhaps they rest on the
view that the Florida courts are free to ignore the Federal Act (i.e., a
narrow reading of Prima Paint). Possibly, these cases reflect nothing
more than an ignorance of the issue by attorneys and judges alike.
Whatever the explanation, the consequence is that until the point is
definitely settled by the Florida Supreme Court, no Florida lawyer
can confidently rely upon the federal rule of enforceability unless he
can also assure his client access to the federal courts.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS AND THE
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS CONFIRMING AWARDS
The third element in the basic legal framework that confronts the
Florida lawyer dealing with an agreement to arbitrate outside this
State concerns the enforceability of arbitral awards and the recogni-
tion of foreign judgments confirming such awards. Even if the Florida
courts would not enforce the agreement to arbitrate, the Florida
lawyer must consider the effect in Florida of a foreign arbitral award
should the arbitration proceeding actually take place. This latter is
always a possibility because the parties may voluntarily go to arbitra-
tion in spite of the non-enforceability of the agreement. Alternatively,
the arbitrators may be empowered to issue an award on the basis of
an ex parte proceeding; and we shall see in the next section, a
foreign court may be prepared to compel the parties to arbitrate even
if a court sitting in Florida would not do so.
Federal Law
Under the Federal Act, a federal district court, upon the petition
of a party to an arbitration proceeding, must confirm an arbitral
33. For treatment of this sensitive issue see Damora v. Stresscon Int'l., Inc., 324
So.2d at 80; Kosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co., 280 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974); Watson v. Chase Chemical Corp., 249 So.2d 53
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award, provided certain conditions are met and the award is not sub-
ject to challenge on the grounds specified in the Act. 34 The Act also
provides for applications to vacate, to modify, or to correct an
award. 35
Before an award may be confirmed, the following conditions
must be met. First, the underlying agreement to arbitrate or the
award itself must relate to a "maritime transaction" or to "commerce
among the several states or with foreign nations." 36 Second, the par-
ties must have agreed that a judgment of a court may be entered
upon the award. 37 This requirement can be met by incorporating
the rules of a trade or arbitration association into the agreement,
provided, of course, that those rules expressly call for the judicial
confirmation of awards. It can be implied from a stipulation that the
arbitration was to be conducted pursuant to the arbitral laws of a
particular state, if those laws provide for judicial confirmation of
awards. Third, the application for confirmation must be made to the
court specified by the parties in the required agreement. Where no
court is specified, application must be made to the court for the dis-
trict in which the award was rendered. While there is some question
as to the effect of this provision in the case of an award issued in a
foreign country, caution suggests that the draftsman of any agreement
pertaining to foreign arbitration specify a particular U.S. District
Court if it is expected that judicial confirmation of the award will be
desirable. It should also be noted that the federal courts have author-
ity to entertain a common law action to confirm an award provided
the court otherwise has jurisdiction of the parties. In this cir-
cumstance, however, the court would be bound to apply the appro-
priate substantive state law on the subject.
Under the Federal Act, a court must refuse to confirm an award
upon a showing: (1) that the award was procured by fraud; (2) that an
arbitrator was partial or corrupt; (3) that the arbitrators exceeded
their powers; or (4) that the arbitrators refused to postpone hearings
upon sufficient cause or refused to hear material evidence or engaged
in other prejudicial behavior. 38
(1971); Shearon, Hammill & Co. v. Vouis, 247 So.2d 733, reh. denied, 253 So.2d 444
(Fla. 1971).
34. 9 U.S.C. at § 9.
35. The grounds for such are specified in 9 U.S.C. at §§ 10, 11.
36. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 201 (stay provisions of § 3 which, like § 9 are not
expressly restricted, held applicable only to transactions involving maritime, in-
terstate, or foreign commerce).
37. Varley v. Tarrytown Assoc., Inc., 477 F.2d at 208.
38. See notes 34 and 35, supra.
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Under the U.N. Convention and its implementing legislation,
the courts in the United States, state as well as federal, are obliged to
confirm foreign awards if the following conditions are met: (1) the
reciprocity requirement noted above has been fulfilled; (2) the
agreement to arbitrate or the award relates to a maritime transaction
or to "commerce among the several states or with foreign nations;"
and (3) the award has become final. 3
Unlike cases governed exclusively by the Federal Act, the im-
plementing legislation relating to the Convention does not require
that the parties expressly agree to the entry of judgment upon an
award. It has, however, been argued that this requirement of the
Federal Act should be read into the Convention. In response, the
courts have either refused to decide the issue or have, without dis-
cussion, appeared to treat such an agreement as unnecessary. While
the latter would seem to be the better view, caution again suggests
that the draftsman include a provision for judicial enforcement in the
underlying arbitral agreement. Also, under the U.N. Convention, a
court is required to refuse confirmation to an award generally on the
grounds outlined above under the Federal Act. 40
When we turn to the federal law regarding the recognition of
foreign country judgments confirming foreign arbitral awards, we en-
counter something of an anomaly. As noted, the Federal Act makes
specific provision for judicial confirmation of arbitral awards generally,
and the implementing legislation under the U.N. Convention specifi-
cally provides for the judicial enforcement of foreign awards. Nothing
in federal law, however, provides for the recognition of foreign judg-
ments confirming foreign arbitral awards. Generally, the question of
the effect to be given in the United States to a judgment rendered by
a court in a foreign country is a question to be determined by state
law even when the action is in a federal court. 41 Thus, we appear to
have a situation where, if one of the parties applies to a federal court
directly from a foreign arbitral proceeding asking that court to con-
39. This is not a serious problem with awards issued in the United States where,
generally, judicial confirmation is conceived of as wholly separate from the arbitral
process, and an award is considered final upon its issuance by arbitrators. In some
foreign legal systems, however, provision is made for summary entry of the award as
a "rule of the court." The question, therefore, remains as to whether this additonal
step is necessary to render the award final.
40. U.N. Convention, at art. V.
41. Samportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1975); Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F.
Supp. 488 (D. Mass. 1966).
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firm the arbitral award, federal law will control the result. If, how-
ever, that same party reduces the foreign arbitral award to judgment
in a foreign court, and then asks a federal court to enforce the foreign
judgment, state law will control the decision. Indeed, under the U.N.
Convention, one lower court has held that the recognition of a foreign
judgment entered upon a foreign arbitral award is a matter controlled
by state law, even if the Convention (i.e., federal law) would have
governed an effort to seek direct confirmation of the arbitral award. 42
Here, a caveat is definitely in order. There are good grounds for
suggesting that the Supreme Court may yet decide that the recogni-
tion of foreign judgments relating to arbitral awards which are in
turn, subject to federal law, will likewise be controlled by federal
law-in this instance, federal common law. 43 Also, under the U.N.
Convention, some courts have tended to disregard the fact that the
foreign arbitral award was reduced to judgment abroad, and to treat
the application for the enforcement of the foreign judgment as an
application for confirmation of the underlying award.
44
Florida Law
When next we turn to the Florida law regarding the judicial con-
firmation of foreign arbitral awards, we again find a disparity between
Florida law and federal law. Under Florida law, a basic distinction
must be drawn between arbitral awards issued in a statutory arbitra-
tion (an arbitration conducted under the Florida code), and awards
issued in so-called common law proceedings (i.e., proceedings not
subject to the Code). 4 Awards issued in a fully-contested statutory
proceeding may, upon the motion of one of the parties, be confirmed
by a court unless it is shown that: (1) the award was procured by
fraud or undue means; (2) a neutral arbitrator was partial or that any
42. Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1
(S.D.N Y. 1973).
43. The Supreme Court has not yet concurred in the refusal of the above-cited
decisions to extend the principles enunciated in Banco National de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), to the matter of recognizing foreign country judgments.
The argument for doing so is fairly persuasive.
44. In re Fotochrome, 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
45. This may be defined as any arbitral proceeding conducted pursuant to an
agreement to arbitrate, which would be enforceable under the Florida Code, should
one of the parties refuse to comply therewith.
Under Florida law, all arbitral proceedings conducted under agreements not in-
tended to be subject to the Florida Code are characterized as "common law" arbitra-
tions, even though the agreement is enforceable under the laws of another state or
foreign country. See Wickes Corp. v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1173.
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of the arbitrators was guilty of corruption or misconduct; (3) the arbi-
trators exceeded their powers; or (4) the arbitrators refused to post-
pone the proceedings upon sufficient cause shown or refused to hear
material evidence, or otherwise so deviated from statutory procedures
as to prejudice the rights of a party. 46 These conditions, it will be
noted, are very similar to the grounds for refusing confirmation of an
award under the Federal Act. Upon grant of a motion to confirm an
award, the latter becomes a judgment enforceable by all means avail-
able for the enforcement of judgments and decrees generally. 47
The losing party in a fully-contested statutory proceeding need
not wait for the winning party to seek judicial confirmation. He may,
by timely motion, seek an order vacating the award. 48 While there
is no authority squarely on point, a strong argument can be made that
under the Florida Code, the courts of this State are fully empowered
to confirm an award issued in a statutory (i.e., a proceeding subject to
that Code) even if one of the parties has defaulted and the award is
issued after an ex parte arbitral hearing, provided that under the
rules applicable to the arbitration, the arbitrators have jurisdiction to
conduct such an ex parte proceeding.
When we turn to the provisions of Florida law relating to the
confirmation of awards issued in proceedings that are not subject to
the Florida Code (i.e., a common law arbitration), we find that the
Florida Code contains some interesting provisions. While, in such a
case, the agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable, any award that
does in fact issue from the arbitral proceedings is nevertheless en-
forceable by the Florida courts if three conditions are met. 49 First,
there must have been a prior unsuccessful action under the Florida
46. FLA. STAT. at §§ 682.12, 682.17.
47. Id. at § 682.15.
48. Id. at §§ 682.13, 682.14.
49. FLA. STAT. at § 682.13(1)(e). Section 682.13, in terms, provides only for the
vacating of common law awards, unless the stated conditions arc met. If those condi-
tions are met, then the statute expressly requires the court to confirm the award.
The question, therefore, is whether the winning party can bring an action to confirm
such an award rather than waiting to respond to the losing party's motion to vacate.
The Florida Code is silent on this point, but requiring the winning party to wait
would be anomalous indeed. Moreover, at common law, awards, even under unen-
forceable agreements, would be confirmed if both parties voluntarily submitted their
dispute to arbitration. Accord, Johnson v. Wells, 73 So. 188 (Fla. 1916). Thus,
§ 682.13 is only in partial derogation of the common law. It requires actual participa-
tion plus a prior unsuccessful § 682.03 proceeding. Nothing in this would suggest a
purpose to deprive the winning party of his traditional common law right to confirm
the award so long as the additional condition for the protection of the loser is met.
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Code to compel arbitration. In other words, the losing party must
have been put on notice by a prior judicial proceeding that his ag-
reement to arbitrate was unenforceable. Second, in spite of such a
judgment, the parties must have proceeded voluntarily to arbitrate
the dispute. 50 This means, of course, that no award issued in an ex
parte common law arbitral proceeding is enforceable under Florida
law, even if the agreed-upon rules governing the arbitration au-
thorized the arbitrators to conduct such a proceeding. 51 Third, the
award must meet all the substantive requirements for confirmation
noted above. 52 In sum, what the Florida Code says is that if a losing
party is put on notice by a court that he is not compelled to arbitrate,
but does so voluntarily, the Florida courts are to enforce any award
that may issue against him.
Lastly, we turn to the rules governing the Florida courts in cases
where those courts are asked to enforce foreign judgments confirming
foreign arbitral awards. Here, two distinct situations can arise. First,
in the case of a foreign judgment issued by a court sitting in a sister
state of the Union, the Florida courts are very likely to find them-
selves under an injunction to accord that judgment "full, faith and
credit" within the meaning of Article VI of the United States Con-
stitution. This, of course, is not the place to detail the scope of that
clause. Nevertheless, two points are of particular note. Even if
neither the arbitral agreement nor the award underlying the judg-
ment could be enforced in Florida if brought directly to the courts of
this State, those courts may nevertheless be required to enforce any
sister state judgment confirming such an award, at least to the extent
the latter calls for the payment of damages. The mere fact that a
money judgment rendered by the courts of one state violates the pub-
lic policy of a state in which enforcement is sought, will not, as a
general rule, relieve the latter from giving "full, faith and credit" to
the judgment. 53
The second point of note, however, is that these rules do not
apply where the judgment sought to be enforced in a Florida court
has issued from a court in a foreign country. The enforcement of such
50. Id.
51. Note also that the defaulting party could have sought a stay of arbitration if
he thought the agreement to arbitrate was invalid, as the dispute was not arbitrable.
Frank 1. Rooney, Inc. v. Charles W. Ackerman of Fla., Inc., 219 So.2d at 110 (in-
junction will lie).
52. See note 46, supra.
53. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
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judgments in Florida is governed by the rules of international
comity. 54 Careless statements by some commentators to the con-
trary, it is clear that the rules of international comity do not require
the recognition of foreign judgments with anything like the rigor of
the "full, faith and credit" clause.
Broadly, the Florida courts apply the criteria for granting comity
to foreign country money judgments that have been developed over
the years through an elaboration upon the United States Supreme
Court's famous decision in Hilton v. Guyot. 55 Under those criteria,
all such judgments are to be recognized and enforced unless it is
shown that: (1) the foreign court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant in the Florida enforcement proceedings did
not conform to U.S. ideas of fairness as embodied in the "due proc-
ess" clause; 56 (2) the foreign judicial sytem, or the particular foreign
court, was biased, arbitrary, or incapable of doing justice, the latter a
most difficult matter to prove; (3) the judgment was obtained by
fraud; (4) the foreign court manifestly disregarded its own law relating
to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the
Florida proceedings; (5) the foreign judgment was offensive to the
public policy of Florida; or (6) courts in the country from whence the
judgment issued would not reciprocate by recognizing comparable
American judgments. 57 This latter requirement has been abandoned
by many if not most states, but still appears to be a part of Florida
law. 58
In connection with our immediate subject, the most important of
these conditions is likely to be the public policy defense. While there
are no cases directly on point, such authority as does exist suggests
that the Florida courts are unlikely to enforce any foreign country
judgment confirming a foreign arbitral award if that award could not
be brought directly to a Florida court and enforced as provided for in
the Florida Code. 59
54. Ogden v. Ogden, 37 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1948).
55. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
56. See Samportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Gum Corp., note 41 supra; Jackson v.
Stelco Employees Credit Union Ltd., 203 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1967).
57. These criteria are nearly all includable within the grounds for non-recognition
of an arbitral award under the U.N. Convention.
58. Ogden v. Ogden, 37 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1948); Warren v. Warren, 75 So. 35
(Fla. 1917).
59. Cf. Pacific Mills v. Hillman Garment, 87 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1956) (It is doubtful
that an ex parte common law award, which cannot be confirmed under § 682.12, can
be enforced by simply reducing the award to judgment in an ex parte proceeding in
the country of rendition).
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V. FOREIGN ENFORCEMENT OF
ARBITRAL AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS
The last basic point a Florida lawyer dealing with an agreement
or a proposal to arbitrate outside the state must consider is the
possibility that a court sitting elsewhere than in Florida will enforce
the arbitral agreement or any award that might issue from the arbitral
proceedings even if a Florida court would not do so. The basic fact is
that the courts in many states of the Union are fully empowered: (1)
to compel arbitration even if the place of arbitration is outside their
territorial jurisdiction; (2) to enforce foreign arbitral awards, even
awards issued in ex parte proceedings; and (3) to enforce foreign
judgments entered upon foreign awards. Also, it must be remem-
bered that most of the states that have reviewed the question con-
sider themselves bound to apply the Federal Act in any instance
where the arbitral agreement relates to interstate or foreign com-
merce. One must assume that all state courts, includng those in
Florida, would comply with the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution and honor the U.N. Convention in cases to which
it is applicable. Inevitably, therefore, the Florida lawyer who is called
upon to advise a client in connection with an arbitral agreement or
award that is unenforceable under the Florida Code must extend his
inquiry to other jurisdictions.
If his client is anxious to proceed with arbitration or is anxious to
obtain judgment on an award already rendered, he must consider the
possibilities of seeking enforcement in some other jurisdiction. If the
client is the recalcitrant party, the lawyer must carefully consider
these other possibilities before advising his client to ignore the other
party's demand for arbitration. This is especially true if the client has
assets out of which an award can be satisfied that are located in some
other state which follows a more liberal policy than that found in the
Florida Code. Even if this is not the case, he must never forget that a
foreign award, unenforceable under Florida law, might be reduced to
judgment in some other state of the Union and then made binding
upon the Florida courts through the operation of the "full, faith and
credit" clause.
In all of this, of course, a sister state court will only enforce an
arbitral agreement or an award if it has personal jurisdiction over the
recalcitrant party under the appropriate state jurisdictional (i.e.,
"long-arm") statute. With regard to arbitration, however, some states
have statutes stipulating that any agreement to arbitrate in that state
constitutes a consent by each of the parties to the jurisdiction of the
courts of that state in all proceedings to enforce the agreement or to
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enforce any award resulting from the agreed-upon arbitral proceed-
ings, even ex parte proceedings. In such instances, no other jurisdic-
tional nexus is necessary.
VI. REVIEW OF TACTICAL OPTIONS
As a way of summarizing what has been said, it seems useful to
sketch, in very general terms, some of the basic tactical options open
to the Florida lawyer who confronts an agreement or a proposed
agreement to arbitrate outside this State, and also to note some of
the practical considerations that will influence his decision.
For the draftsman called upon to prepare an agreement to
arbitrate outside Florida, the first step is to carefully probe the
client's real sentiments toward arbitration as a device for the settling
any future dispute that might arise in his dealings with the other
party. If the client is serious about arbitration-if the arbitral clause
is more than a negotiated accommodation to the other party-and if
the client is likely to prefer an arbitrated settlement of future dis-
putes, the draftsman should expressly provide that the arbitration is
to take place outside Florida but subject to the Florida Code.
Such a clause is not so anomalous as might first appear. The
Florida Code is not a detailed set of rules governing the conduct of
arbitral proceedings. Its procedural injunctions are very sketchy in-
deed. With few exceptions, such procedural rules as are contained in
the Code conform to good arbitral practice generally, would probably
be used even if not mandated by statute, and can, with few excep-
tions, be modified by the parties. In other words, it is eminently
practical for the parties to stipulate that their disputes shall be arbi-
trated under the Florida Code and then either to include in the
agreement a detailed set of rules governing the conduct of the arbi-
tration, or to specify that the arbitration will be conducted in accordance
with the rules of some trade or arbitral association. The latter fre-
quently occurs. All that the lawyer drafting such a provision must do
is to carefully compare the provisions of the Florida Code with the
arbitral rules that the parties otherwise expect to follow in order to
make certain that any inconsistencies between the two pertain to mat-
ters on which the Florida Code permits modification by agreement.
Also, if it has been agreed that the contract generally will be gov-
erned by some substantive law other than that of Florida, the lawyer,
in drafting the arbitral clause, must make clear that the stipulation for
arbitration under the Florida Code constitutes an exception from the
general choice of law clause. Finally, in order to preserve the option
of seeking enforcement in either a Florida court or a federal court,
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the draftsman should also be careful, in any agreement subject to the
Federal Act or the U.N. Convention, to stipulate for: (1) judicial en-
forcement of any arbitral award issuing under the agreement; and (2)
in the case of an agreement to arbitrate outside the United States, for
federal enforcement in a named district court sitting in this State.
The lawyer dealing with an existing arbitral agreement which is
unenforceable under the Florida Code because the place of arbitra-
tion is outside this State faces a much more complex situation. If the
agreement to arbitrate is subject to the Federal Act or the U.N. Con-
vention, if the parties have stipulated for the judicial enforcement of
the award, and if jurisdictional requisites can at all times be met, the
Florida lawyer should probably plan to rely exclusively upon the fed-
eral courts to enforce any award and to compel arbitration, should the
other party prove recalcitrant. In selecting his federal court, however,
the lawyer must pay careful attention to the venue provisions of the
Federal Act and to the stipulations by the parties.
Where, however, the agreement is not subject to federal law, or
the parties have failed to stipulate for judicial enforcement, or where,
in the case of an agreement subject to the Federal Act, the lawyer
cannot be certain of access to a federal court both before and after
arbitration, he must, for all practical purposes, concentrate on the
situation in the Florida courts. Here he must remember that even if
both parties are voluntarily prepared to submit to arbitration, he can-
not guarantee judicial enforcement of any resulting award in Florida
unless he has first brought an unsuccessful proceeding to enforce the
agreement to arbitrate under the Florida Code. Query, if neither
party is actually objecting to arbitration, is there a justiciable con-
troversy? Further, query, if questions of justiciability go to "subject
matter" jurisdiction, is it not possible that an alert court will raise the
issue sua sponte even if not raised by the pleadings? Moreover, he
must weigh the merits of his client's case. If the case is weak, he will
want to consider the advisability of waiting for the other party to
commence the action to compel arbitration and of interposing the
non-justiciability defense without submitting the merits of the dispute
to the court. Lastly, it is doubtful that the justiciability question can
be circumvented by a declaratory judgment action, even though the
Florida courts have, in certain circumstances, entertained such ac-
tions in lieu of motions brought under the Florida Code.
On the other hand, the lawyer representing a client with a
strong case who is anxious to arbitrate the dispute and is being re-
sisted by the other party must obviously consider first the filing of a
motion in a Florida court to compel arbitration even though he knows
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he will be unsuccessful. This is necessary to preserve the enforceabil-
ity of the award should the other party later change his mind and
voluntarily submit to arbitration. At the same time, he must also con-
sider the possibility that the other party will remain recalcitrant.
This, in turn, means he must begin to canvass the possibilities for
resorting to state courts elsewhere in the Union, or to courts abroad.
He may have a number of options, but before turning to a review of
these options, some practical considerations should be mentioned.
The lawyer may very quickly discover that these alternative
means of bringing the recalcitrant party to the arbitration table are
more time consuming and expensive than simply submitting the merits
of the dispute to a Florida court, or to some court that can take juris-
diction of the case. This is especially so if the recalcitrant party has al-
ready commenced or is likely to commence a suit in the Florida
courts on the merits. The lawyer who would prefer to arbitrate may
still find it necessary to defend that suit simply to protect his client's
interests should he lose the race to the courthouse. In all events, if
the recalcitrant party has filed suit in the Florida courts on the merits
of the dispute, the lawyer should consider removal of the case to a
federal court, provided federal law is applicable. If, in spite of the
applicability of federal law, removal is not possible, he certainly
should plead the rule of enforceability under the Federal Act or the
U.N. Convention as a bar to the Florida action. He may even go so
far as requesting the Florida court to compel the recalcitrant party to
arbitrate. While good arguments exist in favor of granting such relief
(i.e., the Florida courts are certainly empowered to grant specific per-
formance of contracts to be performed outside the state), whether he
will succeed or not is anyone's guess. Lastly, he should keep in mind
the possibility that if the Florida courts persist in ignoring federal
law, he may be able to bring an original action in a federal court
under the supremacy clause to enjoin the Florida judicial proceed-
ings.
Because of the present uncertainties surrounding the Florida
court's willingness to apply federal law, the lawyer whose client wants
to arbitrate abroad, but who cannot get into a federal court, should
immediately canvass the possibilities for seeking the aid of some court
outside Florida, whether it be the court of a sister state in the Union
or even a court in a foreign country. Here the selection of the court
will be governed by a number of considerations.
If the recalcitrant party has assets that can be reached to satisfy
the award in the state or country where the arbitration is to take
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place, the lawyer who wants to arbitrate will obviously first want to
consider bringing an action to compel arbitration in the courts of that
state or country. He will want to be sure that those courts will have
jurisdiction over the recalcitrant party, and will thus be empowered
to compel arbitration and to enforce any resulting award. He will also
need to consider the advisability of bypassing an action to compel
arbitration in favor of proceeding directly to arbitrate on an ex parte
basis. Here two conditions must be met: (1) the agreed-upon rules
governing the arbitration must expressly permit the arbitrators to
proceed on that basis; and (2) the courts of the state or country in
which the assets are located must be empowered to enter judgment
upon an ex parte award.
If, on the other hand, the lawyer will ultimately be forced to
look to a Florida court for the effective enforcement of any arbitral
award that his client might obtain, his basic inquiry must be directed
at finding a sister state court that will be empowered to enter judg-
ment upon that award, a judgment he can then bring to Florida
under the aegis of the "full, faith and credit" clause.
Typically, if the arbitration is to take place elsewhere in the
United States, he will look to a court of the state in which the arbitration
is to occur. Again, he must be certain that the court in question will
have jurisdiction over the recalcitrant party. Again, he will also want
to consider the possibility of bypassing an action to compel arbitration
in favor of relying upon an ex parte arbitral proceeding.
If, however, the arbitration is to occur outside the United States,
he must remember that the Florida courts will not honor any award
that the arbitrators might issue if the recalcitrant party has not volun-
tarily submitted to arbitration. Nor will they honor any judgment of a
foreign court entered upon such an award. He must, in other words,
find a sister state court that will have jurisdiction over the recalcitrant
party and will be empowered to honor an ex parte foreign country
award or a foreign judgment entered upon such an award.
Lastly, if he can find no such sister state court, he will be re-
quired to bring an action compelling arbitration in either a sister state
court or a court sitting in the country where the arbitration is to
occur. In this latter event, he may find that his only leverage over
the recalcitrant party is the contempt power of the court issuing the
order. The practical value of such an order must be carefully assayed,
along with the expense and delays likely to attend such an involved
course of action.
